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ABSTRACT. Who supports secession in a multiethnic country? What factors lead to
secessionist or separatist attitudes? Despite the substantial interest in secessionist move-
ments, themicro-level factors and dynamics behindmass support for secession have been
understudied. Using original and comprehensive data derived from two public opinion
surveys, conducted in 2011 and 2013 with nationwide, representative samples, this study
investigates thedeterminantsof separatist attitudesamongTurkey’sKurds.Theempirical
results showthatperceptionsofdiscrimination, ideological factors (i.e. a left-rightdivision
and partisanship), region and religious sect do affect support for secession. Our findings
provide strong support for the grievance theory and, further, show that ideology is an
important factor. However, the results call into question arguments drawing attention to
the role of modernisation (i.e. socio-economic status) and of religiosity. The study also
discusses some practical implications of the empirical findings.
KEYWORDS: autonomy, grievance theory, Kurdish issue, public opinion, religiosity,
secession1
Introduction
Separatist or secessionist movements are prevalent in various parts of the
world (e.g. see Emizet and Hesli 1995; Hale 2000; Horowitz 1985; Richez and
Bodet 2012; Rudolph and Thompson 1985; Sorens 2004, 2005; Treisman 1997;
Williams 1982) and are one of the challenges to the international system of
states. The existing literature provides several empirical studies, investigating
the various aspects of secessionist movements, such as civil war onset, rebel
recruitment, and the strength and success of separatist groups in their struggle
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against central governments (e.g. see for instance Fearon and Laitin 2003;
Gurr and Moore 1997; Hale 2000; Heraclides 1990; Richez and Bodet 2012;
Sorens 2005; Treisman 1997). However, few empirical studies examine the
factors and dynamics behind separatist beliefs and attitudes among individual
members of an ethnic minority (see Cuneo and Curtis 1974; Hagendoorn et al.
2008; Saideman and Ayres 2000). Focusing on popular support for secession,
this study is interested in the following questions: Who supports secession in a
multiethnic country? Why do the members of an ethnic group want to with-
draw their loyalties and political activities from the jurisdiction of the existing
state? What factors drive secessionist or separatist attitudes and beliefs?
We believe that Kurdish separatism constitutes an excellent case for study-
ing popular support for secession because Kurds, who inhabit a land divided
among Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria, are one of the largest ethnic communities
in the world without an independent state of their own (Gottlieb 1994; Gunter
2004).1 It is thus worthwhile to analyse to what extent and why Kurds support
secession from their current state. It would be ideal to examine secessionist
tendencies among Kurds in all those countries. However, due to practical
reasons (i.e. availability of data), we focus on Turkey’s Kurds in this study.
To the best of our knowledge, this study is one of the few quantitative analyses
of mass support for ‘secessionism’ and probably the first one focusing on Kurd-
ish ‘separatism’ in Turkey.
Although Kurdish ethnonationalism has been one of the main challenges
faced by the Turkish state in the last decades, there is little empirical knowl-
edge of Kurdish separatism. Thus, in November 2011, one of the authors
participated in a research team that conducted a nationwide survey to analyse
Kurdish attitudes towards secession in Turkey. In 2013, right after the launch
of peace negotiations between the leadership of the outlawed ethnonationalist
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan [PKK]) and the
Turkish government, the same survey (with some additional questions) was
conducted to determine whether there had been a significant change in Kurds’
attitudes towards secession. As explained later, unlike many other civil war
contexts, the ceasefire between the PKK and the security forces and Turkey’s
relatively more open political environment at that time (see below) provided
opportune conditions for conducting the two surveys for this research project.2
According to the official Turkish state discourse, Kurds residing in Turkey
are not demanding secession. It is believed that ‘the separatist and terrorist’
PKK does not enjoy widespread public support in the region. It is further
claimed that ‘separatist terror’ by the PKK is due to feudalism and socio-
economic backwardness in the region and foreign incitement (Lundgren 2007:
57-72). However, contrary to this official discourse, our descriptive analyses
show the presence of strong separatist attitudes among Turkey’s Kurds. As
Figure 1 shows, in 2011, fifty-five per cent of Kurdish respondents supported
autonomy, while twenty-three per cent demanded total separation.3 And these
figures are on the rise. The results of our second survey, conducted in April
2013 in the aftermath of the start of the peace negotiations with the PKK
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leadership, show that sixty-six per cent of Kurdish respondents demand
autonomy, while thirty-two per cent want separation. These figures also indi-
cate that Kurdish support for autonomy has been relatively higher. This is
probably because since the early 2000s, Kurdish ethnopolitical elites have been
denouncing secession. Instead, they demand a kind of regional autonomy,
labelled by the Kurdish movement either as ‘democratic confederalism’ or
‘democratic autonomy’. Nevertheless, almost one-third of Turkey’s Kurds still
express support for Kurdish independence. Why?
We derive hypotheses from twomain approaches in the conflict literature, and
then test them using original data from our two surveys. These approaches ex-
plore the role of grievance and religiosity in ethnonationalist processes. Our em-
pirical analyses, based on comprehensive survey data, partly support the
grievance approach and question the assumptions of the religiosity perspectives.
Notably, we also find that partisanship (i.e. support for the pro-Kurdish Peace
and Democracy Party, Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi [BDP])4 and leftist ideological
tendencies increase the likelihood of secessionist attitudes, suggesting that polit-
ical and ideological factors and variables also matter in Kurdish secessionism.
The article proceeds as follows: The next section provides a brief discussion
of the grievance and religiosity approaches and draws some testable hypothe-
ses on popular support for secession. The empirical section first presents the
data, variables and measurement and then provides statistical results. The final
section summarises the results of the empirical analyses and discusses further
theoretical and practical implications of the findings.
Hypotheses
Grievance approach
The grievance approach is based on the notion of ‘relative deprivation’, which
refers to the experience of being deprived of something that one believes
Figure 1. Kurdish support for autonomy and secession (2011–2013).
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oneself to be entitled to or qualified for. As Walker, Wong and Kretzschmar
state:
The core of the relative deprivation (RD) construct is that when people’s expectations
about the goods and conditions of life to which they believe they are entitled are
thwarted, they become angry and are motivated to redress the perceived inequity.
Judgments about entitlements can only be made relatively - people compare their
current or anticipated outcomes with those of other individuals or groups. (Walker
et al. 2002: 288)
Relative deprivation theory, then, suggests that as the perceived discre-
pancy between ‘ought’ and ‘is’ increases, the intensity of discontent also
increases. Discontent, frustration or grievance caused by unjust deprivation
or differential treatment, in return, increase the likelihood of ethnic mobilisation
in various forms (Gurr 1970; Gurr et al. 1993). Gurr et al. (1993: 174) asserts
that ‘the greater a group’s relative disadvantage [e.g. political and
economic differentials, poverty, discriminatory treatment] … the greater the
sense of grievance and, consequently, the greater its potential for political
mobilization’.
Discrimination, which is defined as ‘the extent of socially derived inequal-
ities in group members’ material wellbeing or political access in comparison
with other social groups’ (Gurr and Harff 1994: 83), constitutes one source of
grievance and frustration. The causal logic runs as follows: discrimination,
neglect, injustice, exploitation or repression in economic, political, cultural,
linguistic and religious terms are expected to generate discontent, grievance,
resentment, and frustration among the members of an ethnic group. As Gurr
and Harff note ‘[o]n the most basic level, people resent and react against
discriminatory treatment’ (Gurr and Harff 1994). Such feelings provide a
motivating force or legitimation for ethnic mobilisation, which might also
appear in the form of secessionism. Regan and Norton (2005) and Walter
(2006) also find a strong relationship between political discrimination and
rebellions and secessionist civil wars. Thus, the grievance hypothesis postulates
that political, economic and socio-cultural discrimination or disadvantages
faced by an ethnic group are likely to incite separatist tendencies among the
members of that ethnic group.
This approach is relevant to the Kurdish case. Turkey’s security-oriented
policies towards its southeastern region, traditionally inhabited by Kurds and
mostly rural, further promoted the region’s existing socio-economic underde-
velopment. According to official figures from the Turkish Institute of Statistics
(TUIK), the southeast has consistently been Turkey’s least-developed region
(see also Brown 1995; Gunter 2004; Icduygu et al. 1999: 1002-1006; Kibris
2011; Kirisci and Winrow 1997; Mutlu 2001; Sarigil 2012; White 1998).
Further, unemployment and poverty rates are significantly higher among
Kurds in general (Icduygu et al. 1999). Our descriptive analyses based on our
survey data also confirm that compared to Turks, average levels of income
and education are relatively lower among Kurds.
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Kurds have also faced political repression. Until the early 2000s, the state
suppressed any public expression of Kurdish identity, for example, banning
speaking, publishing and broadcasting in Kurdish and shutting down pro-
Kurdish political parties (Aktürk 2011). The state also crossed the line from
suppression to repression, engaging in extra-judicial killings of many hundreds
of Kurdish activists in the 1990s and forced village evacuations.5 As Tezcür
(2009: 3) observes ‘Turkish state policies toward the Kurdish speaking people
involved institutional coercion, policed repression, violent repression and
unpremeditated mass killings’.6 Probably because of the above-noted factors,
perceptions of discrimination are extensive among Turkey’s Kurds. The
results of our 2013 survey, for instance, show that more than half of Kurdish
respondents (fifty-four per cent) think that the Turkish state discriminates
against Kurds, and around sixty per cent of Kurdish respondents believe that
Kurds in Turkey are not equal with Turks in terms of enjoyed rights and
freedoms and socio-economic status.7
One might argue that frustration or discontent with the state’s restrictions on
Kurdish cultural and political rights and the socio-economic disadvantages,
which have followed, has promoted ethnic and political awareness among
Kurds (e.g. see Tezcür 2010: 778). As the grievance approach also asserts, this
situation is rather conducive to the rise of ethnonationalist tendencies. Thus,
if the grievance hypothesis is correct, one might expect that Kurds who per-
ceive discrimination should be more likely to support autonomy or separa-
tion. We test the following hypothesis:
H1a: Members of an ethnic groupwhohave aperception of discrimination by the
central state would be more likely to have separatist attitudes.
Another source of grievance might be the differences in socio-economic or
class status. The modernisation approach, for instance, draws attention to the
role of socio-economic factors and variables in ethnic separatism, linking
ethnic nationalism and separatism to socio-economic underdevelopment or
backwardness. Horowitz, for instance, states that ‘rich regions are not the
leading secessionists. They are far outnumbered by regions poor in resources
and productivity’ (Horowitz 1981: 170, see also Gellner 1983; Hechter 1975;
Horowitz 1985). It is expected, then, that modernisation (e.g. socio-economic
development, upward social mobility) is likely to reduce ethnic nationalism
and separatism because it is believed that higher levels of education and
income would weaken primordial ethnic identifications and loyalties.
The existing empirical literature, however, provides mixed evidence for the
impact of socio-economic status on popular support for secession. In terms of
the supporting evidence, survey research in countries such as Northern Ireland
and South Africa indicates that the most support for separatist groups comes
from people with low income and education. For instance, the Irish Republican
Army (IRA) in Northern Ireland was more likely to recruit volunteers among
low-income groups, including the working class and unemployed
(Hayes and McAllister 2001; O’Gara 2001). In 1970s Quebec in Canada,
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farmers and unskilled workers were more likely to support separatism than the
professional or other middle and upper classes (Cuneo and Curtis 1974).
Several analysts, however, question the modernisation approach. For
instance, it is argued that ‘there are many instances of economically worse-off
people who do not attempt secession, as well as some cases of better-off people
who do (Croatians, Ibos, Basques)’ (Wood 1981: 116). Similarly, Gurr et al.
(1993: 82) states that ‘Spanish Basques, Quebecois, Armenians, Ukranians,
and Slovenes all were separatist in the 1980s despite regional prosperity,
limited autonomy, and significant national political influence’.8 Other studies
even identify a strong positive relationship between socio-economic develop-
ment and separation. Hale (2000) and Hagendoorn et al. (2008) conclude that
economic wealth and development are likely to promote separatism rather
than suppress it. In the Russian context, Hale (2000: 44-5) shows that it is the
richest, rather than the poorest, ethnic regions that are more willing to secede.
To quote him, ‘wealthy ethnic regions have more to fear and less to gain from
remaining in a union state than do poor regions’.9
The modernisation approach, nevertheless, has dominated the Turkish
state’s approach to the Kurdish problem. Until the 2000s, the Turkish state
simply ignored the issue’s ethnonationalist aspect and treated it as a problem
of socio-economic backwardness (i.e. rooted in feudalism, ignorance, poverty)
and of terrorism and banditry (see also Cornell 2001; Ergil 2000; Loizides
2010; Lundgren 2007; Yeğen 1996, 2007). For instance, former Prime Minister
Bülent Ecevit (1925-2006) stated in 2005 that ‘Turkey does not have a Kurdish
problem. There is a socio-economic underdevelopment in the region. By
abusing this, several external factors such as neighbouring and some European
countries have promoted Kurdish terrorism/separatism in the region to
destabilize and divide the Turkish Republic’ (quoted in Sarigil 2010: 538).
Since Kurdish separatism is linked to socio-economic backwardness in the
official state understanding, many state and government officials have
expected that improving social and economic conditions in the region would
reduce or suppress ethnonationalist or separatist beliefs and attitudes among
the Kurds. As a result, Turkish governments have initiated several economic
packages and projects to invest in and allocate resources to the region (Brown
1995; Lundgren 2007: 67-8; Mutlu 2001; Yeğen 2011: 71). Do socio-economic
factors really explain Kurds’ support for secession? We test the following
hypothesis:
H1b: Individuals with high socio-economic status (i.e. a high level of income
and education) should be less likely to support autonomy or separation.
Religiosity approach
The literature contains divergent views about the effect of religion on the onset
and duration of civil war in general and on secession in particular (e.g. see
Collier et al. 2004; Fox 2004; Reynal-Querol 2002; Roeder 2003; Rummel
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1997; Walter 1997). With respect to religiosity, Hayes and McAllister show
that church attendance reduces support for paramilitary violence in Northern
Ireland (Hayes and McAllister 2001). Similarly, Zaidise et al. (2007) argue that
religious people in Israel (Muslims or Jews) are less likely to support political
violence but that socio-economic deprivation reverses that trend.
The religiosity perspective is also discussed frequently in debates about the
Kurdish issue. The pro-Islamic approach (also known as Islamic peace
approach) attributes primary importance to overarching ideas and identities
such as the ‘Islamic brotherhood’ and ‘ummah’ (the worldwide community of
Muslim believers) rather than nationality or ethnicity (Ataman 2003; see also
Sakallioglu 1998: 81). Thus, adherents to this approach consider Islamic em-
phasis on the unity of God and the unity of ummah as incompatible with par-
ticularistic movements (e.g. ethnonationalist claims). Therefore, they believe
that the promotion of an Islamic consciousness and values would weaken the
role of ethnicity in self-identification and as a result restrain ethnonationalist
and separatist tendencies. For instance, Yavuz states that ‘the Islamic layer
of identity could be useful in terms of containing ethnic tensions and finding
a peaceful solution’ (Yavuz 1998: 12).
The leadership of the ruling conservative Justice and Development Party
(Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi [AKP]) also emphasises Islamic unity and brother-
hood (see also Aktürk 2011: 151; Sarigil and Fazlioglu 2013, 2014). The AKP
leadership views Islam as a shared value, and thus a unifying bond or bridge
between the Kurds and Turks. It is believed that Islam provides a supra-
dentity, transcending tribal, ethnic and national identities; thus, it might be
expected that emphasising and promoting Islam and Islamic values among
Kurds would limit or curb Kurdish support for ethnonationalism and sepa-
ratism. The next hypothesis to be tested is as follows:
H2: Religious Kurds are less likely to support separation.
The following section presents the research design and empirical findings.
Data and measurement
To analyse the possible impact of grievance-related factors (i.e. the perception
of discrimination and socio-economic differences) and of religiosity on
popular support for autonomy and secession, we use an original and compre-
hensive public opinion survey data. One of the authors took part in the
research team that developed the survey, which was administered by A&G, a
professional public opinion research company based in Istanbul. Before
implementing the survey, we conducted and participated in pilots in Istanbul,
Ankara, Malatya, Mersin and Diyarbakir provinces. After the pilots, we
invited all regional heads of A&G in Ankara to attend a half-day workshop to
familiarise them with the research project and the questionnaire. Because the
questionnaire included sensitive topics (e.g. one’s attitude towards autonomy
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and secession), some participants might have been reluctant to answer certain
questions or might not have wished to reveal their true preferences (i.e. social
desirability bias). One of our conclusions from the pilots was that Kurdish
participants appeared more comfortable and responsive when they were
interviewed by a Kurdish-speaking female interviewer. Thus, in both surveys, we
used female Kurdish interviewers in regions dominated by Kurds. Outside of
those regions, we usually used Turkish-language questionnaire. The first
survey was implemented through face-to-face interviews with 6,516 respon-
dents, aged 18 and above, from seven regions, 48 provinces and 369 districts and
villages. In 2013, we repeated the same survey with slight modifications. The sec-
ond survey involved face-to-face interviews with 7,103 participants from seven
regions, 50 provinces and398districts and villages.10 In both surveys, respondents
were selected using a multi-stage, stratified cluster sampling procedure. Age and
gender quotas were also applied.
The statistical analyses below were conducted with the data provided by the
Kurdish sub-sample. There are multiple ways of determining ethnic origin. A
common strategy is to use mother language as an indicator. Another strategy
is to rely on respondents’ reports of their ethnic origin or identity. In order to
have a robustness check, we utilised both. Our descriptive analyses using these
two different indicators, however, did not produce very different results. In
addition, these two indicators of Kurdishness do not produce much difference
in terms of mass support for autonomy and secession. Thus, to save space, we
only present the results based on participants’ self-definition as an indicator of
Kurdishness.
In 2011, fourteen per cent of respondents identified themselves as ethnic
Kurds; in 2013, 17.5 per cent of respondents claimed to be Kurdish. Why this
difference? We think that this slight increase is not due to any systematic sam-
pling error because we do not see this much change in the survey’s other ethnic
categories. We believe that the increase is due to the relatively more open
political environment with respect to Kurdish issue that emerged in early
2013. In late 2012, the government launched a new initiative to resolve the
PKK violence. Through Turkey’s national intelligence service (Milli İstihbarat
Teskilati), the government initiated direct talks with Abdullah Ocalan, the
imprisoned PKK leader. At the end of these talks (in March 2013), Ocalan
called for the end of the armed struggle. Three days after Ocalan’s call, the
PKK leadership in Northern Iraq declared a ceasefire and announced its deci-
sion to withdraw its militants from Turkey. The government’s initiation of
negotiations with the PKK leadership and the PKK’s decision to cease the
fighting created new optimism in the country. This new political atmosphere
seems to have encouraged Turkey’s Kurds to be more outspoken about their
ethnic identity and demands, which is positive for data quality.
The main dependent variable in this study is support for secession or
separation among the members of an ethnic group (i.e. Kurds). In one defini-
tion, secession refers to ‘a kind of collective action, whereby a group (whether
officially recognized as a legitimate political subunit or not) attempts to
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become independent from the state that presently claims jurisdiction over it
and, in doing so, seeks to remove part of the territory from the existing state’
(Buchanan 1991: 75). Another definition states that secession is ‘the formal
withdrawal from an established, internationally recognized state by a constitu-
ent unit to create a new sovereign state’ (Bartkus 2011: 2368). Thus, secession
or separation refers to political disintegration, the partition of the original state
and territorial dismemberment. In this study, we examine the determinants of
support for secession among the members of an ethnic group, the Kurds in
Turkey. We are also interested in mass support for autonomy. As a political
arrangement short of secession, autonomy refers to a kind of self-rule or
special status within existing borders. It involves arrangements such as
decentralisation and devolution of power in the political, economic or social
spheres rather than partition or territorial dismemberment.
With respect to the measurement of popular support for secession, some
studies use voting support for secessionist political parties in elections as an
indicator of secessionist attitudes (see Sorens 2004, 2005). We, however, think
that this indicator is not ideal. Individuals might vote for a separatist ethnic
party for other reasons, so a vote for that party may not necessarily reflect a
separatist attitude. It is also possible that ethnic parties might give up separat-
ist demands and instead advocate greater autonomy in political, economic or
social spheres. In other words, ethnic demands might shift back and forth
between autonomy and separation (e.g. see Treisman 1997: 224).11 Thus, com-
pared with voting for ethnic separatist parties, individuals’ opinions and atti-
tudes toward the idea of separation or autonomy would provide a more
direct and precise measurement of mass support for secession. Therefore, in
this study, we use participants’ responses to the following survey items as indi-
cators of mass support for autonomy and secession: ‘Do you support an auton-
omous administration or federation for Kurds (i.e. self-governance of Kurds
inside Turkey)?’, and ‘Should Kurds set up a new, independent state, separat-
ing from Turkey?’12 Those who favour autonomy or secession are coded as ‘1’
and other answers as ‘0’.
Regarding independent variables, we used income and education levels as
indicators of socio-economic status. It is a rather challenging task to quantify
discrimination, but in this study, we are particularly interested in how the ‘per-
ceptions’ of state discrimination influence attitudes to separation. Thus,
utilising the responses to the following question would be appropriate for
our purpose: ‘In your opinion, do you think the state discriminates against
Kurds?’13
Another main independent variable is religiosity. We are aware that it is
also quite difficult to measure religiosity. In the 2011 survey, the respondents
were asked whether they perform prayers five times a day and whether they
fast each day of Ramadan every year. Due to the salience of religiosity in pub-
lic debate in Turkey, we also asked whether headscarves should be allowed in
schools, including primary and high schools and whether female civil servants
and public employees such as judges, prosecutors and teachers should be
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allowed to wear headscarves during work time. Then, we conducted factor
analysis to see whether these variables have high loadings on the same religious
commitment factor or not, based on our suspicion that each measures a differ-
ent dimension of religiosity. We find that the first two and the last two ques-
tions measure different dimensions of religiosity. We then created an index
from these survey items, calling the first one ‘religious practice’ and the second
one ‘religious attitude’ (see Table A1). In the second survey, to measure religi-
osity more precisely, we added new items, such as questions related to belief in
God and an afterlife and attitude towards financial interest and Sharia [Islamic
law]. Similar to the first survey, we also conducted factor analysis, which gen-
erated two additive indices, capturing two different dimensions of religiosity: a
faith dimension vs. an attitudinal-practical dimension (see Table A1).
While testing the above hypotheses, we also control for the possible impact
of several other potentially influential variables such as partisanship, ideology,
residence (rural-urban), region (southeast), unemployment, religious sect, gen-
der and age (see Table A2 for descriptive statistics). Because the dependent
variables are categorical, we use binary logistic regression with robust standard
errors. Table 1 below depicts the logit analyses of Kurdish popular support for
autonomy and separation.
Results
Table 1 presents the empirical results of the analysis of the determinants of
popular support for autonomy and secession among Turkey’s Kurds. The dis-
crimination aspect of the grievance approach finds strong support in our anal-
yses. One of the most robust and consistent findings across the models is that
Kurds with a perception of state discrimination against them are more likely
to be supportive of both autonomy and separation. One might, however, claim
that we should be cautious with this result because there might be an
endogeneity problem here due to a reciprocal causation. That is, Kurds, who
might be demanding secession due to any other reason, might legitimise their
secessionist impulse by claiming that the state discriminates against them. This
would be a fair claim to make. However, due to lack of an appropriate instru-
mental variable, we were unable to apply instrumental variable technique to
address this problem. Although we acknowledge this limitation, we should
add that several historical accounts of the evolution of Turkey’s Kurdish issue
have suggested that Kurdish ethnonationalist movement in Turkey has
emerged as a reaction against the state’s denial and suppression of Kurdish
ethnic identity and rights (e.g. see Barkey and Fuller 1998; Entessar 1992;
Gunter 1990, 1997; Jwaideh 2006; Kirisci and Winrow 1997; Lundgren 2007;
McDowall 1996; Romano 2006; Yeğen 2007). In brief, we believe that percep-
tion of discrimination seems to promote a secessionist impulse among Turkey’s
Kurds. However, given the possibility of reverse causation, there is a need for
further research on this important issue.
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Regarding the impact of socio-economic status, as most of the models in
Table 1 show, income and education do not have a statistically significant im-
pact on secessionist attitudes. Only in Model IV (i.e. the secession model for
2013) do these variables seem to have some effect. However, rather than reduc-
ing separatist tendencies, increases in income increase the likelihood of support
for secession. The only supporting evidence for the modernisation approach is
that Kurds with a high level of education seem to be less likely to support se-
cession. However, overall, these findings suggest that socio-economic status
does not really matter, or at least it does not have a consistent impact on sep-
aratist dispositions among Kurds. This finding is similar to the conclusion
reached by Saideman and Ayres (2000), who, in their cross-national analyses,
also find no supporting evidence for the impact of economic differentials.
Thus, the statistical analyses do not provide much support for the modernisa-
tion theory. One implication of this finding is that socio-economic progress or
development among Kurds may not necessarily reduce support for autonomy
or secession.
Religiosity has no statistically significant impact on support for autonomy
and secession in the first two models. It is, however, interesting that the attitu-
dinal and practical aspects of religiosity increase the likelihood of Kurdish sup-
port for secession in 2013. These findings directly challenge the assumptions of
the pro-Islamic approach and imply that the promotion of Islam and Islamic
values among Kurds would not really suppress Kurdish support for autonomy
or secession.
Finally, among the control variables, we see that political factors do matter.
Voters for the pro-Kurdish BDP are more likely to be supportive of autonomy
and secession, which is another consistent finding across the models and time
periods.14 This result is similar to Clarke et al.’s (2004) observation that when
the members of an ethnic group face fundamental political issues, that involve
both high uncertainty (due to limited or conflicting information) and high
stakes (e.g. a decision about secession), they use partisan attachments and
party identification as one of heuristic devices in their decision making. Thus,
as the authors stress, political parties and elites play cue-giving roles; their
discourses and attitude towards autonomy and secession constitute a focal
point for the members of that ethnic community. Our findings suggest that
the same dynamics are at work in Kurdish support for autonomy and
secession.
With respect to the impact of ideology, left-oriented individuals are more
likely to support autonomy and secession. Why is that so? In the Turkish
context, although Turkish nationalism is associated with the right, the Kurd-
ish nationalist movement (both its peaceful and violent forms) is rooted in the
leftist movement. It is well-known that the PKK emerged out of the revolu-
tionary left in Turkey in the late 1970s with a goal of establishing a united
Kurdistan based on Marxist-Leninist principles (see also Criss 1995;
Jongerden and Akkaya 2011; Ozcan 1999; Taspinar 2005; Yavuz 2001). By
the early 1990s, however, the PKK had distanced itself from such ideas
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but did not (and does not) reject leftist inclinations altogether. The above re-
sult might be interpreted as a result of the leftist legacy of the Kurdish
movement.
We also see a regional effect on the secessionist impulse. In 2011, Kurds
from the southeast were more likely to support autonomy. This result is prob-
ably because the concentration of the Kurdish population and PKK activities
in the southeast, also known as the Kurds’ ethnic homeland, seems to have
produced a stronger ethnic consciousness and greater solidarity among Kurds
in that region. As indicated above, half of all Kurds worldwide live in Turkey,
and most are concentrated in the southeast (see also Brown 1995: 117; Mutlu
1996). The ethnonationalist, separatist PKK is also highly organised and ac-
tive in the region (Kibris 2011). Thus, the combination of these two factors ap-
pears to have empowered support for regional autonomy among Kurds
residing there.
It is striking, however, that although relatively higher support for
autonomy among Kurds in the southeast persists in 2013, Kurds in that re-
gion are now less likely to support secession. How is that possible? We think
that one possible reason for this surprising and sudden change is the call by
imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan in the spring of 2013. On March
21, Ocalan’s message from the prison on Imrali Island was shared by the
BDP leadership with around one million Kurds, gathered in Diyarbakir
Square to celebrate Nowruz (New Day, the New Year).15 With this message,
Ocalan clearly denounced armed struggle and secession and instead asked
for Kurds’ support for the unity and peaceful coexistence of Turks and
Kurds under democratic confederation. This historic call seems to have
had the greatest impact among Kurds in the southeast. For instance,
although support for secession increased almost thirteen per cent in other
regions by 2013 (from 19.3 to 32 per cent), it actually declined by one per
cent in the Kurdish southeast (from thirty-three to thirty-two per cent). This
situation also proves that Kurdish ethnopolitical elites have a relatively
higher degree of influence over Kurds in the southeast. This outcome pro-
vides further supporting evidence for the argument that ethnopolitical
leaders often become principal cue givers for the members of an ethnic group
(see Clarke et al. 2004).
Another notable finding is that sectarian differences (i.e. the Hanefi-Shafi
division) emerge as a determining factor in Kurdish secessionism. Descriptive
analyses indicate that the vast majority of Kurds in Turkey (around ninety per
cent) follows Sunni Islam, which recognises four schools of law (fiqh): Hanefi,
Shafi, Maliki and Hanbali. Among Sunni Kurds, around seventy per cent sub-
scribe to Shafi teachings, while thirty per cent practise the Hanefi understand-
ing.16 Model IV in Table 1 indicates that unlike HanefiKurds, ShafiKurds are
becoming more supportive of autonomy and secession. In other words,
ethnonationalist orientations are becoming stronger among Shafi Kurds. This
intriguing finding suggests that further research on the sectarian division
among Sunni Kurds would be worthwhile.
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Marginal effects
We also calculated the marginal effects of the key significant variables in each
model. First, we present the average marginal effects for the models based on
the 2011 data. For the autonomy model, Figure 2a displays the average mar-
ginal effects of perceptions of discrimination, voting for the BDP, ideology
and region. It indicates that on average, the probability of supporting auton-
omy for those who perceive the existence of state discrimination is sixteen
per cent higher than for those who do not perceive such discrimination. As
for political factors, on average, the probability of support for autonomy is
thirty-two per cent higher among BDP voters compared with voters for other
parties. With respect to ideology, moving from the left to the right of the polit-
ical spectrum decreases the predicted probability of supporting autonomy by
ten per cent. Regarding the marginal effect of region, the probability of sup-
port for autonomy is eighteen per cent higher for an individual living in the
southeast. Figure 2b, which provides the average marginal effects of discrimi-
nation, voting for the BDP and ideology for the secession model, presents a
similar pattern with different magnitudes.
Figure 3 presents the average marginal effects of models’ key variables
using the 2013 data. Figure 3a shows that partisanship (voting for the BDP),
region (being from the southeast) and religious sect (being Shafi) have rela-
tively higher marginal effects on support for autonomy. Regarding secession,
Figure 3b displays that partisanship also has the largest impact on support
for secession. However, region’s marginal effect turns out to be negative:
Kurds in the southeast are fifteen per cent less likely to support secession as
of 2013. As suggested, this shift is probably due to the greater impact of
Ocalan’s message on Kurds living in the southeast.
Conclusions and implications
In conclusion, one of the most consistent empirical findings is that discrimina-
tion-based grievance appears to have positive impact on the secessionist
Figure 2. Average marginal effects for autonomy and secession models (2011).
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attitudes: Indeed, Kurds who perceive that the state does not treat them fairly
are more likely to demand their autonomy or secession. This finding provides
support for the arguments that political grievances are one of the most impor-
tant promoters of ethnic conflicts, which also support the findings of Regan
and Norton (2005) and Walter (2006). Thus, grievance theory should be taken
seriously in studies of Kurdish separatism. However, because socio-economic
factors appear to have weak effect on support for secessionism, it is not reason-
able to expect that modernisation processes would reduce secessionist aspira-
tions among Kurds.
As for the religiosity approach, our findings differ from Hayes and
McAllister (2001), who find that church attendance tends to depress support
for paramilitary violence in Northern Ireland. Our results also contrasts with
those of Zaidise et al. (2007), who draw attention to the similar depressing im-
pact of religiosity in the case of Israel. This result implies that promoting reli-
gious ideas such as the ‘Islamic brotherhood’ and ‘Muslim unity’ among
Kurds as an antidote to Kurdish ethnonationalism or secessionism is not really
a realistic strategy (see also Gurses 2015; Sarigil and Fazlioglu 2013, 2014).
Another major finding is that, contrary to much of the literature, ideological
factors (e.g. a left-right division, electoral support for an ethnic political party)
still matter in secessionism.
If a perception of discrimination promotes secession, what are the implica-
tions for conflict resolution in Turkey? In the last decade, we have seen a ma-
jor change in the state’s attitude towards the Kurdish issue. After the
European Union (EU) accepted Turkey as a candidate country for member-
ship in 1999, Turkey initiated a comprehensive reform process to meet EU
requirements, which also included changes in state’s approach to the Kurdish
issue. For example, since the early 2000s, Turkish governments have legalised
publishing and broadcasting in Kurdish and learning the Kurdish language.
They have also permitted parents to choose Kurdish names for their children,
allowed political party campaigns in Kurdish, opened Institutes of
Kurdology at some public universities, introduced elective Kurdish courses
a) Autonomy b) Secession
Figure 3. Average marginal effects for autonomy and secession models (2013).
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for secondary-level public schools, allowed defence in one’s mother language
during court trials; restored some Kurdish place names, removed the
(Turkish) nationalist oath recited by students at schools and allowed educa-
tion in one’s mother language in private schools. Given that Turkey denied
even the existence of a distinct Kurdish ethnic identity until the early
1990s, such reforms constitute major changes. However, as shown above,
at least half of Turkey’s Kurds still think that the state discriminates against
them. Therefore, Turkish governments should take further steps to limit dis-
crimination perception among Kurds.17
Finally, we should take into account the recent developments in the region,
which are likely to affect the relationship between discrimination-based griev-
ance and separatist beliefs among Turkey’s Kurds. One relevant development
is that Kurds in Iraq and Syria have gained significant political and economic
powers in the last decades. In the aftermath of the Gulf War (1990-91), a de
facto Kurdish state was established in Northern Iraq (Freij 1998; Gunter
1993, 2004; Lundgren 2007; Rafaat 2007).18 In addition, Syrian Kurds also
gained a kind of autonomy, following the withdrawal of Syrian army from
Kurdish areas (northern and north-eastern Syria, also known as Rojavaye)
in 2012. The Turkish state fears that such regional developments might en-
courage or incite a separatist disposition among Turkey’s Kurds (such an oc-
currence is also called the demonstration effect) (Brown 1995; Lundgren
2007). Such fears are not groundless as existing studies provide some empirical
support for the ‘demonstration effect’. For instance, Saideman and Ayres
(2000) show that secessionism is contagious in the sense that if there is active
separatism among a group’s kin elsewhere, the likelihood of the group as a
whole desiring separation increases (see also Gurr et al. 1993; Hale 2000;
Sorens 2005). Thus, given such regional developments and the contagious na-
ture of secessionism, it becomes even more vital that the Turkish state should
initiate further reforms in political, economic, social and cultural realms to
curb Kurdish perceptions of discrimination and so secure their loyalty.
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Notes
1 Although the origin of the Kurds is still disputed, there is general consensus that Kurds are the
descendants of Medes, an Indo-European tribe (see Entessar 1992: 3; White 2000: 14). Regarding
the linguistic and religious characteristics, the Kurdish language is regarded as a member of the
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Iranian languages, which stem from the Indo-European family (Entessar 1992: 4; Jwaideh 2006:
11; White 2000: 16). Like their Turkish compatriots, most Kurds (ninety per cent) subscribe to
the Sunni Muslim faith.
2 The estimated number of deaths due to the conflict between 1984 and 2012 is around 40,000.
However, the ceasefire and the peace process, which was initiated in 2013, collapsed in summer
2015. Both domestic and regional developments played a role in this outcome. For instance, the
ruling Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi [AKP]) was highly disturbed
by the Kurdish gains in Northern Syria (e.g. the formation of de facto autonomous cantons in
the region and successful Kobani resistance) and the impressive electoral performance of pro-
Kurdish People’s Democratic Party (Halkların Demokratik Partisi, HDP) in the 2015 general elec-
tions, which made singly party government impossible and complicated AKP’s plans for installing
a presidential system. All these developments weakened AKP’s commitment to the peace process.
As a response, the PKK resumed armed attacks against security forces in the aftermath of the gen-
eral elections.
3 The vast majority of ethnic Turks (around ninety-five per cent), however, is against the estab-
lishment of an independent Kurdish state.
4 In 2014, the BDP was replaced by the HDP. During its first electoral competition (i.e. the June
2015 general elections), the HDP received thirteen per cent of national votes and secured 80 seats in
the parliament, an unprecedented electoral success in the history of Kurdish ethnopolitics.
5 For one estimation, the number of extra-judicial killings between 1990 and 2011 is 1901 (see
Milliyet, 25 January 2012. http://www.milliyet.com.tr/21-yilda-1901-faili-mechul/gundem/
gundemdetay/26.01.2012/1493812/default.htm. Accessed on 4 March 2015).
6 For more discussion on the evolution of state attitudes towards Kurds, see Gunter 1990 and
1997, Entessar 1992, McDowall 1996, Kirisci and Winrow 1997, Barkey and Fuller 1998, Jwaideh
2006, Romano 2006, Lundgren 2007, and Yeğen 2007 and Aktürk 2011.
7 However, only nine per cent of ethnic Turks think that the state discriminates against Kurds.
8 See also Roeder 1991, Emizet and Hesli 1995, Treisman 1997 and Sorens 2005.
9 See also Sorens 2004 and Sambanis and Milanovic 2011.
10 The following provinces are included in the sample: Adana, Adıyaman, Afyon, Agrı, Amasya,
Ankara, Antalya, Aydin, Balikesir, Batman, Bingol, Burdur, Bursa, Cankırı, Corum, Denizli,
Diyarbakir, Elazıg, Edirne, Erzurum, Eskisehir, Gaziantep, Giresun, Hatay, Isparta, Icel, Istan-
bul, Izmir, Karabük, Kayseri, Kırklareli, Kocaeli, Konya, Malatya, Manisa, Maras, Mardin,
Nigde, Ordu, Osmaniye, Rize, Sakarya, Samsun, Sivas, Tunceli, Trabzon, Sanlıurfa, Usak, Van
and Zonguldak.
11 The Kurdish movement constitutes a good example of such shifts. The PKK, which emerged as
a separatist organisation in the mid-1970s, distanced itself from the idea of separation in its later
years (see also Criss 1995; Kibris 2011). Especially since the early 2000s, the PKK and pro-Kurdish
legal political parties have been advocating greater autonomy for the Kurds within a federal
structure.
12 For a similar measurement strategy, see Hagendoorn, Poppe and Minescu 2008.
13 In this study, we are more interested in the possible impact of ‘perceptions of discrimination’ on
secessionist attitudes. In future research, we intend to investigate whether the type of discrimina-
tion (economic, social or political) creates any difference.
14 In terms of voting preferences, the majority of Kurdish respondents declare that they prefer
pro-Kurdish BDP. In terms of voting preferences across religious sect, Shafi Kurds are more likely
to prefer the BDP, while Hanefi Kurds tend to vote for the AKP.
15 Diyarbakir is the largest city in the southeast, mostly inhabited by Kurds. Kurdish
ethnonationalists consider the city as Kurdish capital.
16 The most popular schools within Sunni Islam in Turkey are the Hanefi and Shafi teachings,
which are quite similar in terms of faith. Their differences seem to be more related to rituals or
practices. For instance, Shafis perform morning prayer earlier and they hold their hands in a dif-
ferent position during prayer. They also have different rules for what disturbs ritual purity (see
Bruinessen 2000: 15). Although the majority of Turkey’s Sunni Kurds follow the Shafi under-
standing, the vast majority of Turks (around ninety per cent) subscribes to the Hanefi school,
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which was the official school of the Ottoman Empire. The Turkish state is still in favour of
Hanefi school.
17 Some of major Kurdish demands are decentralisation, a democratic constitution recognising
Kurdish identity, the removal of ten per cent electoral threshold, public education in mother lan-
guage and amnesty for PKK members.
18 The Kurdistan Regional Government, which rules the Kurdish region in Northern Iraq, has its
own parliament, army, flag and national anthem.
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0.916 0.148 Daily prayer
(five times)
0.707 0.60









Support for Sharia 0.546 −0.009
% of variance 37 22
Notes: Extraction method: Principal component analysis.
Rotation method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalisation.
Rotation converged in three iterations.
The values in bold indicate relatively higher factor loadings.
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